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THE RENAISSANCE OF ACCIDENT LAW PLANS REVISITED
ROBERT
I.

L.

RABIN*

INTRODUCTION

A paucity of reflective thought about the underpinnings of accident law: that is the underlying theme of Guido Calabresi's opening
chapter in The Costs of Accidents (Costs).' And correspondingly, it can
be taken as the linchpin for his pathbreaking volume, as he writes in
1970. Calabresi begins by noting the upsurge of interest in "plans," by
which he means legislative efforts and proposals to supplant conventional tort doctrine-the negligence system-with a nonfault-based
compensation scheme of one sort or another.2 Concurrently, he
notes a then-emerging parallel challenge to the fault system in the
judicial domain, strict liability for product injuries.' He laments the
absence of an ideological framework, both in the legislative sphere
4
and the courts, that would make sense of the various developments.
And, of course, the remainder of the book is devoted to constructing a
theoretical edifice that would illuminate the premises of liability systems addressing the social problem of accidental harm.
Let me unpack the reference to "plans." Viewing accident law
from the vantage point of 1970, Calabresi offered a brief account of
five categories of plans that seemed both topical and representative of
the undertheorized character of accident law reform proposals.' Two
of these-the Defense Research Institute approach and the Blum and
Kalven Stopgap Plan-have since fallen into the dim recesses of tortreform history, and can conveniently be subsumed into more general
reflections on auto no-fault.6 The other three strategies that he
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I would like to thank
Suzanne Bratis for her very helpful research assistance.
1. GuIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3-16
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 13-14.
4. Id. at 5-16.
5. Id. at 6-14.
6. See id. at 11-13 (discussing Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., A Stopgap Planfor
Compensating Auto Accident Victims, 547 INS. LJ. 661 (1968)). The Stopgap Plan provided
for no-fault compensation for all victims of automobile accidents. The plan proposed to
offer the option of collecting up to $5,000 in medical expenses and up to $7,500 in disability, loss of services, medical impairment, and survivor's loss payments to all automobile
accident victims, including those hurt in accidents involving no driver fault whatsoever,
and to use general state tax revenues to fund the additional costs of motor vehicle injuries,
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surveys-social insurance/welfare legislation, first-party auto no-fault,
and strict liability for defective products 7 -can serve as a port of entry
for a broader view of developments in nonfault approaches since the
publication of The Costs of Accidents.
On that score, I will begin by surveying how the renaissance has
fared in the ensuing years. In the next Part of this Article, I will indicate the pathways taken by the resurgence of interest in nonfault approaches since 1970. In particular, I will discuss two systems of
reparation that stand in contrast to fault-based liability: no-fault compensation schemes and strict liability in tort (for product injuries)systems that are consonant with Calabresi's range of concerns, but at
the same time reflect a view of nonfault-based compensation substantially broadened beyond the motor vehicle area.
These developments, of course, did not arise in a vacuum. In an
immediate sense, the successful legislative efforts to reconceive the domain of tort law reveal the byways of interest group politics. From a
scholarly perspective, however, one can ask, as Calabresi did a generation ago, whether latter-day efforts to reconstitute accident lawwhether in the legislative arena or in the courts-reveal a greater fidelity to coherently articulated goals than was evident in earlier times.
In exploring these questions, in Part III of this Article, I will discuss
some related questions as well: Was accident law, in fact, as undertheorized as The Costs of Accidents suggests? And does the notion of theorizing about legislative compensation plans resonate in similar fashion
to theorizing aboutjudge-made tort law? The principal thrust of this
Part will be to determine whether there are identifiable themes underlying nonfault alternatives to traditional tort that illuminate the staying power of the fault system.

on the premise that many nonfault accidents are "no more associated with motoring
than ... with pedestrianism, drinking, or living in our society." Blum & Kalven, supra, at
665-68.
The Defense Research Institute plan rejected the auto no-fault concept. THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 10. Instead, it sought to maintain the fault-based system for
auto injury claims and to bolster that system with a variety of accident prevention programs, many of which would have necessitated legislative action. Id. at 10-11. The programs included: (1) enactment of implied-consent laws allowing police to administer
breathalyzer tests without first arresting the suspect; (2) increased monitoring of driver
skills; (3) increased drunk driving penalties; (4) increased tracking and punishment of
persons repeatedly involved in accidents; (5) increased penalties for drunken pedestrians
involved in automobile accidents; (6) heightened training and testing requirements for
young drivers; and (7) periodic vehicle safety inspections. Defense Research Institute, A
Programfor Highway Accident Prevention, 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 65, 65, 68 (1968).
7. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 6-10, 13-14.
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In a brief concluding Part, I will offer some summary thoughts on
the legacy of Costs, drawing on my survey of the observable patterns of
legislative and judicial activity over the past thirty-fi e years.
II.

NONFAULT SYSTEMS:

AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE?

In hindsight, Calabresi treated auto no-fault as the centerpiece of
8
his nonfault universe just as the movement was about to peak. By the
mid-1970s, sixteen states had adopted auto no-fault plans, and then
the movement ran out of steam.9 Only the District of Columbia subsequently adopted a scheme, and its plan was repealed within three
years of enactment." Indeed, in something of a rollback, two of the
earlier-adopting states switched to a "choice" system under which drivers are offered the option of no-fault or tort, and three repealed their
plans altogether. 1
In 1970, as Calabresi wrote, Massachusetts was about to adopt a
first-party plan based on the Keeton-O'Connell proposal that he treats
2
in Costs as his principal reference.1 But its impact on the fault system
in motor vehicle cases was minimal: The statute provided compulsory
no-fault for medical expenses and seventy-five percent of lost earnings
incurred within two years up to the strikingly modest combined sum
of $2,000, excluding this amount from tort recovery along with an
even more modest threshold for pain and suffering." A far more substantial no-fault scheme, which might have served as a model for other
8. SeeJ. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44
J.L. & ECON. 427, 435 n.13 (2001) (noting that 1974 was the median year of adoption for
states adopting no-fault automobile insurance).
9. DAVID S. LOUGHRAN, THE EFFECr OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ON DRIVER
BEHAVIOR AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 & n.1, 7 (RAND Inst. for
CivilJustice, Doc. No. MR-1384-ICJ, 2001).
10. Id. at 1 n.1.
11. Id. at 1 n.1, 7.
12. See 1970 Mass. Acts 670; THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1; at 7-10 (discussing
the plan developed in ROBERT E. KEETON &JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECrION FOR THE
TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965)).

13. 1970 Mass. Acts 670 §§ 2, 5. The Massachusetts plan may have been modeled on
Keeton-O'Connell, but it was not an enactment of their proposal. They had proposed a
maximum no-fault benefit payout of $10,000 and a dollar threshold of $10,000 (before a
victim could opt to bring a tort suit). KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 273. The

Massachusetts scheme instituted different levels. The original legislation had a $2,000 benefit payment provision and a dollar threshold for tort option of only $500. 1970 Mass. Acts
670 §§ 2, 5. Subsequent amendments to the plan raised both levels: $8,000 for no-fault
benefits and $2,000 for the tort suit threshold, but at no point has Massachusetts enacted
the balance between these two factors that Keeton-O'Connell envisioned. 1988 Mass. Acts
273 §§ 15, 55 (codified as amended at MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West 2001));
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6D (West 2000)); see Herbert I. Weisberg & Richard A.
Derrig, Massachusetts Automobile Bodily Injury Tort Reform, 10 J. INS. REG. 384, 386 (1992);
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states, was enacted in New York in 1 9 7 3,just as auto no-fault was about
to fall into precipitous decline.' 4 The New York plan replaced tort
liability for the first $50,000 in "basic economic loss," and excluded
pain and suffering recovery as well, except for various defined "serious
injuries," unless that threshold was met. 15
More generally, the auto no-fault plans adopted by the various
states fall into two basic categories: "modified" and "add-on" plans.
The specific contours of the schemes vary significantly from state to
state. Modified compensation plans restrict access to the tort system
for some portion of auto accident victims. 6 For example, states can
limit tort claims to those injuries of a given medical or monetary severity, and accordingly limit victims that fall below that threshold to nofault compensation only. 7 Add-on plans provide limited no-fault benefits as an alternative source of compensation without adopting
thresholds on access to tort.1 The only restriction placed on tort recovery under such schemes is that claimants cannot recover damages
under both no-fault and tort for the same item. 9 States also vary on
the maximum amount of benefits that can be recovered under the nofault programs. In the mid-1980s, all of the add-on states had caps on
medical benefits of either medium ($10,000 to $25,000) or low
($5,000*or less) levels.2z The modified-plan states were divided almost

Massachusetts Bar Association, Tort Law: Filing an Auto Insurance Claim (Apr. 28, 2000),
available at http://www.massbar.org/lawhelp/legalinfo/index.php?sw=3122&full-id=232.
14. 1973 N.Y. Laws 13.
15. Id. §§ 671, 673. The New York dollar limits have remained the same. Comprehensive Motor Vehicle Insurance Reparations Act, N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 5100-5102 (McKinney
2000).
16. See John E. Rolph et al., Automobile Accident Compensation: Who Pays How Much How
Soon, 52J. RISK & INS. 667, 670 (1985).
17. See id. As of 1985, the following states had adopted modified compensation
schemes: Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, NewJersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
Id. at 672 tWl..
18. Id. at 670. As of 1985, the following states had adopted add-on schemes: Arkansas,
Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 672 tbl.1.
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLow-UP REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES 41-49 (1985).

This restriction

operates in several ways. First, if the insured opts for a tort suit, he may be barred "from
pleading or introducing into evidence ...damages for which [no-fault] benefits are available." Id. at 43. Second, if the insured recovers in tort, the insurer may have the right to be
reimbursed for any no-fault benefits that it has paid out. Id. at 45. Finally, a court may
subtract from tort damages any no-fault benefits already received by the insured. Id. at 47.
20. Rolph et al., supra note 16, at 672 tbl.1.
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($50,000 or more), medium, and low medical
equally among high
2
benefit provisions. 1
Why did auto no-fault rapidly lose its nationwide impetus? In my
view, a principal reason can be traced to the broader cross-currents of
major tort reform. 22 Both auto no-fault and workers' compensation,
the earlier forerunner of broad-based replacement of the tort system,
can be located in the context of major social welfare reform movements: in the case of workers' compensation, Progressive-era initiatives (and in particular, labor legislation); in the case of auto no-fault,
the consumer/environmental movement of the late 1960s-early 1970s,
which had as one principal focal point health and safety concerns related to motor vehicles.2" By the mid-1970s, the latter reform impulse
was almost entirely spent-aided, perhaps, in the case of auto no-fault,
by internal reforms of the tort system such as the adoption of comparative fault as a replacement for the harsh contributory negligence bar.
Whatever the explanation, nonfault legislative reform of traditional tort took on a new character after the mid-1970s. It became
narrower in focus and more the product of classic interest group politics (which had been notably absent in the case of much of the consumer/environmental legislation enacted in the immediately
preceding years, as well as the auto no-fault movement) .24
A.

Legislative Nonfault Systems: Post-1970

1. Black Lung Disease Compensation.-Indeed, just as Costs was
published a no-fault scheme that foretold future developments-focused in character and the product of interest group bargaining-was
enacted. The Black Lung Benefits Act provides benefit payments and
medical treatment for coal miners totally disabled from black lung
disease (pneumoconiosis) .2' A series of events led to the creation of
the program. The 1960s witnessed a decline in coal production and
coal prices throughout the nation.2 6 Unemployment rates among
coal mine workers rose significantly.2 7 Traditionally in the industry, a
welfare and retirement benefits fund had been maintained by the
21. Id.
22. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 13 (1988).
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id. at 22.
25. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000). This compensation scheme began with the passage of
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742.
26. PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

27. Id.

4 (1987).
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large coal miners' union, United Mine Workers of America (UMWA),
and funded through a price-per-coal-tonnage tax paid by mine owners.2" The fall in revenues and rise in unemployment rendered the
fund an inadequate source of benefits.2 9 At the same time, a grassroots movement began among miners that pushed black lung disease
to the forefront of union issues.3" The workers' compensation programs of most states did not provide benefits for occupational disease,
and despite pressure by these grassroots groups, UMWA failed to get
an occupational benefits provision added to the mine workers' contract during labor negotiations.3" Finally, in 1968, a mine explosion
occurred at a large mine site in Farmington, West Virginia, killing 78
miners and bringing national attention to the issue of coal mine
32

safety.

By the end of the 1960s, Congress faced political pressure from a
variety of sources to take action on mine safety generally, and more
specifically on the provision of black lung benefits." The UMWA,
which was itself under strong attack by smaller miners' unions, lobbied for a federal black lung benefits program. 4 At the same time,
mine owners fought against any federal action that would put more
economic pressure on the already declining coal industry.3 5 Addition-

ally, state legal and health professional groups opposed any move to
shift workers' compensation away from state control.3 6 In the end, the
union interest prevailed on the federalism issue, and the Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 in essence plugged the occupationaldisease hole in the state workers' compensation programs, at least for
coal miners afflicted with black lung disease.3 7
28. Id. at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 9.
31. Id. at 8-9.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 10-16.
34. Id. at 9-12.
35. Id. at 15-16, 23.
36. Id. at 22-23.
37. Id. at 27-30. The contours of the federal black lung program have changed over
time, influenced by lobbying efforts on behalf of the coal miners, and then responsive to
concerns about steeply rising costs. See id. at 38-50. Tide IV of the 1969 Act created a
benefits program for underground coal miners who were totally disabled from black lung
disease and for the dependents of coal miners who had died from the disease. Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, tit. IV, 83 Stat. at 792-93. The 1972 amendments
expanded the definition of "total disability" to include those miners unable to obtain gainful employment because of black lung disease. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-303, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 150, 153-54. These amendments extended benefits to surface
miners and to survivors of miners with black lung disease even if the miner had died of
another cause. §§ 3(a), 4(b)(2), 86 Stat. at 153-54. The amendments also provided that a
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To receive benefits, a miner (or the miner's dependent survivors)
must prove that he suffers from black lung disease, that he is totally
disabled from the disease, and that he contracted the disease from
coal mining-related employment.3 8 Under most circumstances, it is
9
the last employer of the claimant who is responsible for benefits.
Compensation under the scheme is scheduled at a percentage of the
pay rate for federal employees (GS-2, step 1);4o for FY 2003, benefits
41
came to $535 per month with graduated increases for dependents.
42
Surviving spouses receive
Medical benefits are recoverable in full.
benefits on the same monthly schedules as do the miners themselves,
a provision that allows beneficiaries to request lumpthough there is
43
payment.
sum
If Costs notes a "renaissance," it is presumably a rebirth harking
back to workers' compensation as a progenitor of nonfault plans. In
this regard, the black lung scheme can be regarded as the apple that
did not fall far from the tree. The design features just sketched out
are strikingly similar to the workers' compensation model: scheduled
negative chest x-ray could not be the sole basis for a denial of benefits and it created a
rebuttable presumption of the presence of black lung where the claimant could prove 15
years of underground coal mine employment and total disability due to respiratory or pulmonary impairment. § 4(c), (f), 86 Stat. at 154.
The criteria for benefits were expanded even more by the 1977 amendments. Black
Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978). The definition
of "miner" was rewritten to include individuals who work in or around coal mine or coal
preparation facilities and who were exposed to coal dust. Id. § 2(b), 92 Stat. at 95. The
most recent amendments, the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, have made eligibility for benefits more difficult. Pub. L. No. 97-119, tit. 11, 95 Stat. 1643 (1981). The 1981
amendments overturned some of the provisions passed in 1972, including the rebuttable
presumption of eligibility for 15-year coal mine employees. Id. § 202(b) (1), 95 Stat. at
1643. The 1981 law also reinstated the requirement that survivor claimants prove that
their spouse's death was caused by black lung disease. § 203(a) (4), 95 Stat. at 1644.
38. 30 U.S.C. § 932(c).
39. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.494, 725.495 (2004). The operator responsible for benefit payments is the "potentially liable operator" that most recently employed the miner.
§ 725.495(a)(1). The principal limitation is that the miner must have been employed by
the operator for a cumulative period of not less than a year. § 725.494(c).
In addition to direct benefit payments, coal mine operators are required to pay an
excise tax to support the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9501(b) (2000).
The Fund is used to pay administrative costs and claimant benefits in cases where the liable
operator has defaulted on payments or cannot be identified. § 9501(d).
40. 30 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).
41. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., Worker's Compensation, in 2004

GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURJSDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 15-WC-8 (Comm. Print 2004), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/workerscomp.pdf.
42. 20 C.F.R. § 725.701. For background on the Act's provisions on medical benefits,
see Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 147 F.3d 502, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1998).
43. 30 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2); 20 C.F.R. § 725.521.
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income replacement benefits for a specified, permanently disabling
condition; medical expenses recoverable in full; no recovery for intangible loss; periodic payments; and funding by employer contribution." In a perhaps fitting turn, then, the compensation gap created
by the coverage limitations of existing state workers' compensation
programs-limitations precluding recovery for occupational diseasecame to be filled by federal legislation referenced to the workers'
compensation model.
2. Childhood Vaccine-Related Injury Compensation.-The National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 19864" was created in response to an
upsurge in tort claims.4 6 In the early 1980s, several reports were issued estimating the number of children seriously or fatally injured by
adverse reactions to vaccines.4 7 The number of lawsuits filed against
vaccine manufacturers and health care providers increased during
this time and a handful of large verdicts were entered.4 8 These events
led a number of companies to leave the industry.4 9 In response to a
perceived crisis of vaccine shortages, Congress created a no-fault alternative to tort liability.5" The goal of the program was to provide compensation for victims of vaccine-related injuries while giving
protections to private vaccine manufacturers so they could continue
making products deemed essential to the public welfare without a
looming threat of massive tort awards. 5 '
The Act established a compensation fund that is financed
through an excise tax on each dose of vaccine distributed. 2 Under
44. See generally

ORIN

KRAMER

& RICHARD

BRIFFAULT,

WORKERS

COMPENSATION:

(1991).
45. Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. III, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34(2000)).
46. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, pt. 1, at 6-7 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 House Report].
47. E.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., COMPENSATION FOR VACCINERELATED INJURIES: A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM (1980); Am. Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees,
Report of the Ad Hoc Commission on Vaccine Injury Compensation, 49 CONN. MED. 172 (1985).
48. See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Labs., 828 F.2d 510, 511 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming ajury
award of $1,131,200 in a negligence claim against a vaccine manufacturer); Johnson v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1320, 1327 (Kan. 1986) (reversing a $10,000,000jury verdict
against a vaccine manufacturer).
49. Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Product Safety:
Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1858 (1995) (noting that six manufacturers ceased production of vaccines in the mid-1980s out of fear of financial exposure to
tort liability).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-17.
51. See 1986 House Report, supra note 46, at 7. For a more detailed treatment of the
politics of the enactment of the Act, see THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL
RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 142-70 (2002).
52. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4131, 9510 (2000).
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT
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the Act, a person claiming a vaccine-related injury must file a petition
3
for compensation in the United States Court of Federal Claims. A
special master evaluates the claim to determine whether it meets the
criteria for benefits from the compensation fund. 54 To qualify for
compensation the claimant must show: (1) that she has suffered an
injury listed on the Vaccine Injury Table; (2) that the vaccine significandy aggravated a pre-existing condition; or (3) that the vaccine
caused an injury not listed on the Table.55 For eligible claimants, the
statute covers all actual medical expenses, rehabilitation costs, and lost
earning power, based on the average earnings of workers in the nonfarm sector of the economy. 56 Compensation for pain and suffering
may also be awarded up to a limit of $250,000.5' Eligible claimants
have the option of rejecting the compensation offer and pursuing a
58
tort claim, but it is a seriously constrained tort option. Likewise,
those claimants deemed ineligible for compensation are free to seek
tort relief.59
The Childhood Vaccine Act, and the next-to-be discussed birthrelated compensation schemes, introduced a new plot element into
the narrative of nonfault compensation: legislative responsiveness to
the perception of a public health crisis. On that score, a similar view
can be taken of the ill-fated Swine Flu Vaccine Act.6' How was cer53. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1I(a) (1).
54. § 300aa-12(a).
55. § 300aa-1 I(c)(1). The Injury Table lists certain vaccines with corresponding adverse events and time intervals between the administration of the vaccine and the occurrence of the event. § 300aa-14. Where a claimant is asserting an injury not listed on the
Vaccine Injury Table, she bears the burden of proving that the vaccine did in fact cause the
injury. § 300aa-1 I(c) (1) (C) (ii) (I). For injuries listed on the Table, causation is presumed
and need not be proved by the claimant. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (A).
56. § 300aa-15.
57. § 300aa-15(a) (4).
58. § 300aa-21. The Act puts three main constraints on claimants who choose to pursue the tort option. First, in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it permits
manufacturers to use the provision of an adequate warning as a defense against liability.
§ 300aa-22(b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. k (1965).

Second, the Act

adopts the "learned intermediary" doctrine, which requires an adequate warning only to
the person who administers the vaccine. § 300aa-22(c). Finally, the Act allows a manufacturer's compliance with Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act regulations to shield it
against punitive damages. § 300aa-23(d) (2).
59. § 300aa-21 (a) (2).
60. National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
1113 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(1) (repealed 1978)). It should be noted
that this was a governmental liability replacement scheme, rather than a privately funded
no-fault plan. In February of 1976, military servicemen in NewJersey were diagnosed with
a strain of flu virus related to swine flu. In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig.,
533 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (D. Colo. 1980). Congress enacted the Swine Flu Act with the
goal of preventing an epidemic within the U.S. similar to that of 1918-19, which took more
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tainty of financial exposure-the sine qua non of continuing market
presence by the key suppliers-to be achieved? In the Childhood Vaccine Act, as earlier, the quest for certainty culminated in an insurance
scheme that for all practical purposes banished tort from the playing
field and replaced it with responsibility primarily limited to economic
loss, tight ceilings on high-end recovery, and funding by flat
contributions.
In context, the vaccine plan can be viewed as narrowly focused.
Just as neurological birth defect litigation, next discussed, was a relatively small island in the sea of medical malpractice litigation, so too
were childhood vaccine cases but a minor contributor to the volume
of drug defect litigation. Nonetheless, in what came to be perceived
as a crisis atmosphere, the individual rights perspective of tort yielded
to a collective, insurance-based model of compensation.
3. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation.-Beginning in
the 1970s, the nation experienced a rise in medical malpractice lawsuits.6 ' The upsurge of tort litigation triggered increases in medical
malpractice insurance premiums and decreases in insurance availability for practicing physicians.6 2 Malpractice claims for birth-related injuries are brought at a relatively high rate, and they often result in
large monetary awards. 6" The high risk of financial exposure led malpractice insurance companies in many states to raise premiums and
severely limit their coverage for obstetricians. 64 In two states, Florida
than 500,000 American lives. Id. The Act sought to have the entire adult population of the
U.S. inoculated by November of 1976. Id. at 571. During the same time period, the country was experiencing a collapse of the commercial liability insurance market for vaccine
manufacturers. Id. at 572. Thus, as part of the Act, Congress implemented a vicarious
liability provision that replaced tort liability of the manufacturers. The provision created a
cause of action against the government for any claims of negligence or wrongful death, but
made all damage awards final and left claimants with no alternate cause of action in tort.
National Swine Flu Immunization Program, sec. 2, § 247b(k), 90 Stat. at 1114-16; see also
Swine Flu, 533 F. Supp. at 571.
61. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 26-27 (1991).
62. Id.
63. See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Clains Resolution: How NoFault and Tort Differ, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 37 (1997); see also FRANK SLOAN ET AL.,
SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 191-93 (1993).
64. See, e.g., DavidJ. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of

Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1495-98 (1988) (discussing
the malpractice insurance "crisis" that obstetricians faced in the mid-1980s); Peter H.

White, Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an EndangeredSpecialty, 74 VA. L. Rv. 1487,
1488 (1988) (noting that in 1986, Virginia's two largest malpractice insurance carriers refused to write any new policies for obstetricians, and a third carrier adopted a national
policy under which it would terminate coverage for all obstetric practices with less than ten
doctors).
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and Virginia, legislatures responded to this move by the insurance
companies, by enacting no-fault birth-related neurological injury compensation plans.65 In both states, a compensation fund was created
66
through contributions from participating physicians and hospitals.
The programs provide full compensation for the child's necessary
and reasonable medical expenses, including hospital, rehabilitative,
residential, special equipment, and custodial care, as well as the costs
67
of filing a claim, including attorney's fees. Under the Virginia plan,
families are compensated for the child's lost earnings-assessed from
ages eighteen to sixty-five and calculated at fifty percent of the average
68
weekly wage of nonfarm, private sector workers. There is no comparable provision for recovery of unrealized earnings in Florida. In Florida, families may receive a lump-sum pain and suffering award capped
at $100,000;69 Virginia has no provision for recovery of intangible loss.
A 1997 study of the Florida and Virginia schemes found that famifor injuries that
lies have continued to file malpractice lawsuits, even
70
Although both
could be eligible for no-fault compensation.
against particiremedy
exclusive
an
schemes aspired to make no-fault
Florida statute
the
pating physicians apart from exceptional situations,
has been judicially interpreted to leave the tort option open under
many circumstances. 71 Indeed, in Florida, roughly half 72of the claimThe study
ants studied filed their initial claim in the tort system.
a nofiled
who
families
the
of
also found that twenty-seven percent
chose
then
fault claim but were deemed ineligible for compensation
73
to pursue a tort remedy. By contrast, in Virginia, where the option
restriction is considerably more stringent, the study found that approximately only fourteen percent of the families initially filed a tort
claim.74 Currently, Florida and Virginia remain the only two states
that have such no-fault systems in place, but a bill proposing a similar
STAT. ANN.
65. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA.
Injury
§§ 766.301-.316 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
2002).
(Michie
-5021
to
38.2-5000
§§
Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN.
rating.
66. These contributions are annual flat fees with no provision for experience
38.2-5020.
§
ANN.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.314(4)-(5); VA. CODE
state pay67. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009. Both states reduce
programs.
ments by the amount paid by private insurance policies or other government
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(1) (a); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(A)(1).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(A) (3).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31 (1)(b).
70. Sloan et al., supra note 63, at 46.
71. Id. at 38.
72. Id. at 48.
73. IM. at 46.
74. Id. at 48.
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plan was introduced in the New Jersey legislature in 2003 and is still
under consideration.7 5
Like the black lung and vaccine programs, these schemes are designed to remove the key discretionary elements of intangible loss,
future wage replacement, and unlimited ceilings on recovery that
characterize tort. The birth defect compensation plans also abandon-even more than black lung-any effort to tie financing obligations to risk-creating conduct, relying instead on flat-levy funding.
The tradeoffs on the dimensions of risk prevention, spreading, and
administrative cost considerations-theoretical considerations to be
discussed in greater detail in the next Part-are quite explicitly encoded in the statutory framework.
4. September 11 Victim Compensation.-Perhapsthe most dramatic
nonfault scheme enacted since Calabresi surveyed the scene in 1970
was a consequence of the greatest trauma to American society in the
same period, the events of September 11, 2001. Within two weeks of
the terrorist acts, Congress established the September l1th Victim
Compensation Fund (the Fund), adopting a no-fault compensation
scheme for the personal injury victims and survivors of those who perished. 76 The Fund is unprecedented in a variety of ways that I have
spelled out in detail elsewhere. 77 For present purposes, I would simply contrast it to a model that can be gleaned, in rough outline, from
the legislative compensation schemes discussed above-noting, at the
outset, the most obvious difference: that the Fund was an ex post response to a discrete event rather than an ex ante model for a category
78
of continuing injury

victims.

In sharp contrast to the traditional model, the Fund rejects the
tradeoff central to the conception of workers' compensation: that in
return for benefits available without reference to fault, those eligible
under the scheme are limited to recovery of economic loss-with the
75. Assemb. 3148, 210th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2003).
76. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
tit. IV,
§ 405(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (reprinted at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
note (Supp. I
2001)).
77. See Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating Victims of September
11, 49
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 573, 574-81 (2001) [hereinafter Quest for Fairness].
78. Id. at 577. In this regard, a "mixed" model would be an asbestos victims'
no-fault
fund, presently languishing in Congress, that would offer compensation
to tens of
thousands of present claimants, as well as enormous numbers of future, still-to-be-identified claimants. See Asbestos Compensation Act of 2003, H.R. 1114, 108th Cong.
A second critical difference is that the Fund is government financed, rather
than enterprise or activity financed, as in the earlier-discussed no-fault schemes. The
implications
of this key distinction are discussed at the outset of Part III.
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wage loss component of any such recovery further subject to scheduled limitations based on type of harm and ceilings reflecting notions
of horizontal equity. As I have indicated, other no-fault compensation
schemes enacted since Costs was published adopt the workers' compensation premise-although, in some instances, allowing for rela79 Instead, the Fund was
tively modest, fixed-sum pain and suffering.
designed to allow recovery of economic loss, defined to include not
just medical expenses and loss of present earnings, but "loss of business or employment opportunities"-presumably future lost income-"to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under
applicable State law."8 ° Along with this strikingly open-ended, individualized approach to future economic loss, the Fund provided for noneconomic loss recovery, not in the fixed-sum, limited terms found in
some no-fault schemes (assuming any non-economic loss is recognized), but with allowance of "losses for physical and emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any
kind or nature."8 1
This sweeping provision for non-economic loss-exceeding even
the bounds of traditional tort recovery for pain and suffering-was
adopted
subsequently redefined in fixed-sum terms in the regulations
2 The SpeFund.
the
by the Special Master appointed to administer
cial Master also established a schedule of "presumed economic loss"
that gave sharper definition to recovery for lost income, as well as establishing a presumptive ceiling on recovery-albeit an extraordinarily high one-the ninety-eighth percentile of individual income in
3
the United States in 2000."
The question remains whether the Fund, with its distinctly
tortcentric perspective on recovery, as contrasted against the workers'
compensation model grounded in social welfare notions of horizontal
equity, represents the direction for the future. In my view, there is
79. See supra notes 57, 69 and accompanying text.
80. § 402(5), 115 Stat. at 237.
the Act does
81. § 402(7), 115 Stat. at 237. In contrast to these tort-type provisions,
115 Stat. at
405(b)(6),
§
sources.
collateral
have a strong preclusive provision regarding
see Ra239. On the scheme's embrace of certain tort principles and rejection of others,
576-81.
at
77,
bin, Quest for Fairness, supra note
104.1-104.71
82. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. §§
plus
(2003). The regulations presume non-economic losses of $250,000 for decedents,
104.44.
§
deceased.
the
of
dependent
each
and
spouse
the
for
$100,000
83. § 104.43.
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good reason to think that the Fund model will have a very limited
shelf life, and that any future resort to no-fault replacement of tort is
likely to reflect the principles first established nearly a century ago in
the workers' compensation model.8 4 On this score, the Special
Master's regulations are particularly revealing. As indicated above,
the statutory language adopting an individualized, case-by-case approach to lost income and non-economic loss in claims of survivorstantamount to the most liberal version of wrongful death recovery
schemes in tort-was simply overridden by the Special Master in an
effort to reshape the structure of benefits under the Fund in more
traditional, categorical terms, through reliance on presumptions,
scheduling and capping of damage awards.8 5
Moreover, the hybrid tort/compensation model adopted by Congress for September 11 redress can well be regarded as sui generis. In
its rush to judgment, Congress was particularly concerned about the
solvency of the airlines-and, in fact, capped the aggregate liability in
tort for those who chose to opt out of the Fund at the insurance limits
of the airlines and other potential defendants. 8 6 Because there was a
general sense that these aggregate claims-including property damage tort claims outside the Fund-might far exceed insurance limits,
the tort option could well have been viewed as creating a limited fund
for victims that would fall far short of traditional tort recovery. Hence
the impulse to build tort-type compensation into the Fund option. In
addition, in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy, there clearly was
a sense that the victims were stand-ins for all Americans-that they
should be viewed as heroes, martyrs, or both-and afforded whatever
special recognition could be attached to the extinguishment of their
lives.8 7
Note, too, that this special sense of generosity was very quickly
exhausted. Efforts to extend Fund-type recoveries retroactively to the
surviving families of earlier acts of terrorism that might well have been
regarded as similar in character-the Oklahoma City bombing and
the earlier bombing at the World Trade Center-were to no avail.88 A
related no-fault fund for smallpox vaccination victims, established
84. See generally Robert L. Rabin, The September I 1th Victim Compensation Fund:
A Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 769 (2003) [hereinafter
September
l1th Victim Compensation Fund].
85. The Special Master's regulations were upheld against a challenge that he
had exceeded the authority conferred upon him by the enabling statute. Schneider
v. Feinberg,
345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
86. § 408(a), 115 Stat. at 240.
87. Rabin, Quest for Fairness, supra note 77, at 576.
88. Id. at 588.
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with little fanfare after September 11, was designed along traditional
lines.8 9 And more generally, the state crime victim compensation statutes, which might be regarded as broadly analogous in purpose to any
future provision for victims of terrorist-related activity, are far more
modestly designed to meet the immediate out-of-pocket needs of eligible claimants.9"
B. Judicial Nonfault: Products Liability
In Costs, Calabresi devotes only a paragraph to noting the unsettled character of products liability law in 1970, remarking that: "It is
said that products liability law has become or is becoming an area of
strict liability, that is, that users now often recover for defects regard9
less of the manufacturer's or seller's fault." " Much of the theoretical
framework that is then developed in Costs bears directly on the case
for strict products liability, and Calabresi would address the topic of
the unsettled character of products liability law with far greater partic9 2 But as time passed, judicial refineularity in subsequent papers.
a conceptual
ments would greatly undermine the notion that
93
occurred.
revolution in the world of tort had in fact
108-20, 117
89. Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
no-fault benefits
Stat. 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 239 (Supp. 2004)). The Act provides
personnel who suffer injury or death after
to health care workers and other emergency
3
are eligible for
receiving the vaccine. Id. § 261 (a) (2)-( ), 117 Stat. at 638-39. Claimants
of the injury
time
the
at
income
their
of
66-2/3%
of
rate
a
at
lost-income reimbursement
Lost-income pay(75% when there are dependents). § 265(b) (1)-(2), 117 Stat. at 642.
is not to exceed
ments are capped at $50,000 annually, and the lifetime lost-income benefit
Public Safety Ofthe death-benefit received by police officers and firefighters under the
117 Stat. at 643;
ficers' Benefits (PSOB) Program, currently $275,658. § 265(c)(3)(A),
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
The lifetime-benefit
gov/BJA/grant/psob/psobmain.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2004).
total disability."
cap does not apply to claimants who suffer "permanent and
survivors of the
for
benefit
death
a
provides
scheme
The
643.
§ 265(c) (3) (B), 117 Star. at
paid for lost income.
decedent in the amount of the PSOB death benefit, less any benefits
§ 264(a), 117
§ 266(a), 117 Stat. at 643-44. Reasonable medical expenses are also covered.
§§ 264(b),
Stat. at 641. All benefits are secondary to other public-benefit programs.
loss.
non-economic
for
provision
no
is
There
641-44.
at
Stat.
265 (c) (1), 266(b)(3) (B), 117
796-98.
at
84,
note
supra
Fund,
Compensation
Victim
I
th
I
September
Rabin,
90. See
91. THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 1, at 13.
in Torts, 81
92. See Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts,
Liability
for
Tests
Four
Klevorick,
K
Alvin
&
Calabresi
Guido
(1972);
YALE L.J. 1055

14J.

LEGAL STUD.

585 (1985).

Quiet Revolution in
93. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The
480-81 (1990)
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479,
turn
significant
a
demonstrated
1980s
the
in
beginning
(arguing that judicial decisions
limitations
from expanding the boundaries of products liability law to placing substantial
on plaintiffs' ability to recover).
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By 1998, when the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
was published, strict liability for product injuries, as it had been envisioned in the landmark section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, was in serious retreat.9 4 In the years between the early California landmark opinions boldly enunciating a doctrine of strict liability-for example, Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp.,95 expressing "no
difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation [of strict liability] to
the full range of products liability situations, including those involving
'design defects' 9 6-and the Restatement (Third), it had come to be
generally accepted that products cases fell into three discrete categories: manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects. 9 7 It
also became generally accepted that with respect to design defects,
risk-utility analysis-tantamount to a fault determination-was the
dominant approach.9" So, too, in the case of warning defects, reasonableness analysis governed; indeed, it had almost certainly always supplied the applicable standard in claims of failure to warn adequately. 99
What this left in the way of nonfault liability was manufacturing
defects-many of which had been similarly resolved through the medium of res ipsa loquitur even before the apparent rise of nonfault
liability' °°-and a limited subset of design defect cases in a handful of
jurisdictions that adhered to a consumer expectations approach. 1 '
94. Strikingly, strict liability is not even mentioned in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts:
Products Liability.
95. 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
96. Id. at 1162.
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucrs LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (providing
tripartite treatment for product defect cases).
98. Id. § 2(b), cmt. g. But there is considerable critical commentary on
limiting the
test for design defect to risk/utility. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations
of Consumers,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700, 1704 (2003) (arguing for a "reinvigorated understanding
of the
[consumer expectations test] that fulfills its purpose of providing a normatively
desireable
alternative to the risk-utility test").
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrTY § 2(c), cmt. i,
Reporters'
Note cmt. i.
100. Id. § 3 cmt. a.
101. Id. § 2, Reporters' Note cmt. d(II)(D). I would emphasize "limited subset."
Most
cases that in fact are best characterized as "consumer expectations" claims
involve manufacturing defects, not design defects. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
882 P.2d 298,
308 n.3 (Cal. 1994) (providing examples of "design defect" cases where consumer
expectations analysis would be appropriate: "For example, the ordinary consumers
of modern automobiles may and do expect that such vehicles will be designed so as not to
explode while
idling at stoplights, experience sudden steering or brake failure as they leave
the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-hour collisions."). Clearly,
in the real
world, each of these examples involves a manufacturing defect. Moreover,
as Soule itself
held, the consumer expectations test is inapplicable in cases involving technically
complex
products, where the consumer has no ex ante basis for having expectations
about risks
associated with the product. Id at 308-09.
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Nonfault liability might also have achieved some degree of promi10 2
Products Corp.
Johns-Manville
v.
Beshada
followed
had
courts
if
nence
In that case, involving a claim for asbestos-related disease, the New
Jersey Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that the manufacturer had no knowledge of the health risks associated with asbestos
3 Nonetheless, the court rejected
at the time plaintiff was injured."'
the defendant's effort to rely on a state-of-the-art defense, asserting
that "[s] trict liability focuses on the product, not the fault of the manufacturer."1 °4 This ex post view of liability for after-acquired information about risk was soon rejected by the same court in Feldman v.
Lederle Laboratories, °5 however, in which the court limited Beshada to
its facts (asbestos cases), and adopted an ex ante, negligence-type approach for other cases involving risk information that only arises after
product distribution.1 0 6 The ex ante approach is widely followed elsewhere, although not without occasional confused efforts to maintain
the consistency of such an approach with the conception of strict
liability. 107
C. End of an Era?
As far back as 1914, a distinguished legal scholar, Jeremiah Smith,
mused over the question of whether the advent of no-fault compensation for industrial injuries heralded the demise of fault-based liability:
"[I]f this statutory rule as to workmen is intrinsically just or expedient,
is there sufficient reason ...

for refusing to make this statutory rule

the test of the right of recovery on the part of persons other than
102. 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
103. Id. at 542-43.
104. Id. at 546.
105. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
106. Id. at 385-88.
107. For example, in Ferayorniv. Hyundai Motor Co., 711 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998), the court adopted what it understood to be the California position spelled out in
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991), and Carlin v. Superior
Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996):
While we recognize that a required showing of knowledge or constructive knowledge makes strict liability "to some extent a hybrid of traditional strict liability and
negligence doctrine," we find that this result best serves to promote the countervailing policies underlying strict liability articulated in [an earlier Florida case].
As we construe Anderson, manufacturers are to be held to a higher standard than
that imposed under negligence jurisprudence, but are not reduced to insurers;
manufacturers are not required to warn of every risk which might be remotely
suggested by any obscure tidbit of available knowledge, but only of those risks
which are discoverable in light of the "generally recognized and prevailingbest" knowledge available.
Ferayorni, 711 So. 2d at 1172 (citations omitted). The latter standard could as easily be
described as the requisite test for manufacturer negligence.
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workmen when they suffer hurt without the fault of either party?" '
For a generation and more, there was no direct answer to this question, as nonfault extensions beyond workers' compensation were
largely absent from the radar screen of legislatures and courts. 10 9 In
this sense, it seems apt for Calabresi to have referred to the recent
developments, as he wrote in 1970, as a "renaissance" in the making.
But a survey of the nonfault landscape thirty-five yearn later
reveals a renaissance that in fact never really came to fruition. In the
principal areas of accidental harm other than work-related injuriesin particular, motor vehicle accidents, premises injuries, product mishaps, medical malpractice, and toxic exposures-fault-based principles remain the dominant liability standard. Although there have
been creative proposals offered for extending broad-based nonfault
liability to medical and product injuries, they have not been endorsed
in the legislative arena. 1 Rather, as I have indicated, the principal
108. Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARv. L. REV.
235, 251
(1914).
109. But see REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE

AcCI-

DENTS TO THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

(1932)
[hereinafter COLUMBIA PLAN] (proposing an auto no-fault plan modeled
on workers' compensation). On the common-law side, the Restatement of Torts included a provision-little
utilized-for strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 519-520
(1938).
110. In the medical malpractice area, Professors Havighurst and Tancredi proposed
a
no-fault insurance model entitled "Medical Adversity Insurance" (MAI)in 1973.
See generally Clark C. Havighurst & Laurence R. Tancredi, "MedicalAdversity Insurance'.-A
No-Fault
Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q.:
HEALTH &
SoC'Y 125 (1973), reprinted in 613 INS. LJ. 69 (1974) [citations below to the reprint];
see also
Clark C. Havighurst, "MedicalAdversityInsurance"--HasIts Time Come?, 1975 DUKE
LJ. 1233.
The MAI system was designed as an alternative to medical malpractice litigation,
not as a
full replacement. Under the proposal, MAI policies would create a list of "compensable
events," specifically designated injuries eligible for compensation. Havighurst
& Tancredi,
supra, at 71. A claimant who could show he or she suffered from a compensable
event
could recover medical expenses and limited wage losses without having to prove
fault. Id
Malpractice victims who did not suffer from a compensable event would still
be free to
pursue a claim in tort. Id. at 74-75. For a comprehensive analysis of medical
no-fault,
proposing experimentation with a scheme along with a review of other reform
options, see
WEILER, supra note 61, at 44-69.
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has proposed a variety of comprehensive and focused
nofault schemes, including proposals that would extend to the products field.
See generally
JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES,
INSURANCE AND INJUSTICE
(1987). His "early offer" plan provided tort defendants with a 120-day window
in which
they could offer the claimant a settlement in the form of periodic payments.
Jeffrey
O'Connell & ChristopherJ. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in PersonalInjury
Tort Law:
A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN.
L. REv. 137,
149-50 (1999). The settlement offer had to be an amount that would cover the
claimant's
wage loss and medical expenses, but required no allowance for pain and suffering.
Id at
150. If the defendant chose not to offer the settlement, the claimant's tort action
would be
litigated under normal common-law rules. Id. However, if the defendant did
choose to
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no-fault extensions after 1970 have been limited to narrowly-focused
pockets of accidental harm-vaccine and neurological birth defects
(the latter in just two states) -and a horrific event, September 11, that
triggered an ex post compensation scheme limited to victims of the
terrorist acts.
So too, in the courts, the early landmark decisions of the California Supreme Court and the bold initiative in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which many observers took as signaling a
radical departure from the common law in assigning responsibility for
product-related harms, appear a generation later to be grounded in
an expansive conception of the fault principle.
Instead of bold and sweeping replacement of fault-based liability,
the hallmark of the past thirty-five years has been incremental tort
reform. Beginning in the mid-1970s, with the perception that rising
costs of malpractice insurance were wreaking havoc in the medical
profession, state legislatures have responded with alacrity, establishing
a variety of limitations on tort remedies (although largely leaving the
substantive law principles untouched).1 1 1 The early prominent initiative was the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA),
adopted in 1975 by California, 1 2 establishing a model that would be
influential nationwide: limiting recovery for pain and suffering to114a
maximum of $250,000;"' establishing limits on contingency fees;
altering the collateral source rule;" t 5 and requiring periodic payments
make an offer, the claimant would face disincentives (e.g., a higher burden of proof) to
reject that offer and pursue the tort action. Id.

On an even broader scale was Professor Stephen Sugarman's social insurance proposal. See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSATION

MECHANISMS

POR

VICTIMS,

CONSUMERS,

AND

BUSINESS

127-48,

167-91

(1989).

Sugarman advocated the compensation of all disability, regardless of whether the source of
that disability was accident-related or not. Id at 127-48. As with O'Connell's "early offer,"
Sugarman's plan would not provide compensation for pain and suffering (except perhaps
in more serious cases). Id. at 134. However, unlike the no-fault schemes addressed above,
Sugarman's social insurance proposal was designed to be a replacement for, not an alternative to, the tort system. Id at 127. For short-term needs, compensation under the social
insurance plan would be provided by an extension of employment-based income replacement and health benefit plans. Id. at 135-36, 141-43. For longer-term needs, und the
needs of unemployed persons, compensation would come from an expanded social security system. Id. at 136-43.
111. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 787-92 (7th ed. 2001).
112. 1975 Cal. Stat. 2d. Ex. Sess. 3949 [hereinafter MICRA]; see also FRANKLIN & RABIN,
supra note 111, at 787-88 (discussing MICRA).
113. MICRA, ch. 1, sec. 24.6, at 3969.
114. Ch. 1, sec. 24.2, art. 8.5, at 3967.

115. Ch. 2, sec. 1.19, at 3990.
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under certain circumstances.1 16 Almost thirty years later, when Texas
passed a package of similar limitations on medical malpractice claims,
it avowedly followed the California model."1 7 In the interim, three
identifiable waves of tort reform occurred-in the mid-1980s, mid1990s, and at present.11 8 The central features build on the California
experience but extend further in many cases to across-the-board measures, rather than focusing exclusively on medical malpractice, and
also frequently include limitations on joint and several liability and
punitive damages, as well as following the MICRA model by addressing non-economic damages, the collateral source rule, and the contingency fee.1 1 9
III.

NONFAULT SYSTEMS:

A.

A

SATISFYING THEORETICAL FOUNDATION?

The Legislative Forum

A convenient point of entry for thinking about the role of theory
in grounding nonfault systems is to revisit the most highly publicized
of the recent plans, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
I refer here not to the mix of compensation, deterrence, and administrative cost considerations that establish a framework for assessing how
this plan measures up against more traditional nonfault models or the
tort system, but to a more fundamental question. Like all focused nofault schemes, the Fund carves out a category of accidental harm victims for special treatment, raising a threshold question of horizontal
equity.
In particular, the Fund makes a claim for special treatment on
behalf of victims of terrorist incidents. But what precisely is the premise on which this claim rests? 2 ' The Fund itself can be narrowly
116. Ch. 2, sec. 26, at 3971.
117. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Ass'n, Talking Points for CSHB 4, at http://www.texmed.org/
liability/cshb4_talkpoints_051203.asp (last modified May 12, 2003); Tex. Med. Ass'n, Why
Texas Needs a Flat, $250,000 Cap on Noneconomic Damages, at http://www.texmed.org/
liability/cap-ned.asp (last modified Mar. 26, 2003).
118. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 111, at 787-91.
119. In the latest round, beginning in 2001, many states began to experience a resurgence in medical malpractice costs. More than a dozen states have considered or passed
malpractice reform legislation. The malpractice reform measures currently being passed
by the states cover the same gamut of issues advanced in the 1970s, namely limitations on
attorney's fees, damage awards, collateral source recovery, and statutes of limitations. See
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES HEALTH POLICY TRACKING SERV., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: TORT REFORM (NETSCAN iPublishing, Apr. 1, 2004) (citing measures taken by

Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
120. The discussion here draws on Rabin, September 11th Victim CompensationFund, supra
note 84, at 799-803.

2005]

THE RENAISSANCE OF ACCIDENT LAW PLANS REVISITED

719

construed as a special case: terrorism as manifested in a singularly horrific sequence of events was tantamount to an act of war. So characterized, however, it appears, upon initial consideration, to be of limited
interest; it was simply the occasion for an ad hoc political response.
On further reflection, however, a conception of September 11 victims
as tantamount to soldiers fallen in battle is not unprecedented-a similar conception of victims as martyrs of attacks on the nation can be
found in the Israeli no-fault scheme for compensating victims of terrorism.' 2 1 Israel provides benefits to all victims of terrorist activities
and their families. In the case of death from a terrorist act, survival
benefits are identical to those of the families of soldiers killed in the
line of duty.' 22
Whatever one makes of the rhetoric of a "war on terrorism" in the
context of our current national state of affairs, linking a compensation
scheme to alien enemy attacks establishes an uneasy justificatory principle. Is there good reason to opt for a no-fault scheme that would
distinguish between events with the strong commonalities of September 11 and Oklahoma City, on the grounds that Timothy McVeigh was
an American citizen rather than a foreign operative? At the same
time, the war rhetoric is placed under considerable strain if victims of
McVeigh are afforded similar treatment to September 11 victims. The
logical consequence would be that the nation has been at war with
various benighted predecessors to McVeigh, from white Aryan
survivalists to Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber-all of whom have
claimed multiple innocent victims out of a sense of rage against the
social order, as they viewed it.
In fact, the more closely one focuses on terrorism as the linchpin
for a no-fault plan, the more unstable the foundation becomes. Cut
loose from the war rhetoric, there remains the possibility of grounding the establishment of a scheme in some special sense of indebtedness to the unfortunate victims of terrorist activity; some basis for
expressing a special sense of national gratitude or bereavement. Of
course, there is nothing illegitimate about these sentiments. But they
seem to miss the mark in the context of the Unabomber's victims, or
those who fell before the brief reign of terror of the Washington-area
snipers, John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, in October 2002.
Another justificatory principle would be the failure of the state to
meet an implicit obligation to provide public security in each of these
121. See Victims of Hostile Action (Pensions) Law, 1970, 24 L.S.I. 131 (1969-70) (referencing Fallen Soldier's Families (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 115
(1949-50)).
122. Id.
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instances. But there is a striking disjuncture between this rationale
and the judicial resistance in tort to recognizing a general obligation
on the part of the police to prevent criminal acts that result in personal injury. 12 3 More generally, ajustification based on governmental
failure to provide adequate security offers no satisfactory stopping
point from a no-fault perspective short of a blanket assurance that anyone injured by a random act of violence in a public place will receive
124
state compensation.

To discriminate among this multitude of victims, all of whom
were, in the common vernacular, victims of terrorism, seems at odds
with a basic sense of fairness-that is, treating like cases in like fashion. Yet none of the justifications offered above seems to satisfy a
claim for wholesale recognition of these disparate incidents of
terrorism.
There would be no call for these refined distinctions among terrorist activities in defining the parameters of eligibility if instead one
substituted a broader conception, focusing on victims of criminal violence-as in the state victim compensation programs. 125 Still, however, the search for a satisfying justificatory principle would remain
problematic. The highly respected English scholar, Patrick Atiyah,
has been one of the most outspoken critics of the English Criminal
Injuries Compensation Scheme, adopted in 1964,126 which played a
formative role in triggering California's pioneering adoption of a similar program one year later in this country.1 27 Atiyah levels a general
attack on the Scheme:
123. See, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that a
municipality is not liable for simple failure to provide police protection and enumerating a
four-factor test for establishing the limited circumstances in which a "special relationship,"
and hence a duty, would exist).
124. Interestingly, however, this argument may have special force in the context of September 11, in view of the allegations of security lapses prior to the events of that day. In
particular, the statements of Richard Clarke raised the level of awareness both on the part
of the public and Congress. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccesss.gov/911/.
125. See LISA NEWMARK ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF STATE
VICTIMS OF CRIME Acr COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE ADMINISTRATORS (2001). Every state has a

crime victim compensation scheme in place. Id. at 4. While these programs vary significantly between states, in general they provide monetary compensation for victims of violent
crime who have suffered physical injury and for the survivors of homicide victims. Id.
Funds may be used for crime-related expenses including medical, dental, mental health,
funeral and burial, lost wages or lost support, and even crime scene clean-up costs. Id.
126. For background on the English scheme, see Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic
Perspectiveon the Compensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLocY 333 (1994).
127. See 1965 Cal. Stat. 1549.
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The [Home Office working party] committee never really
came to grips with the crucial issue, which is not whether
victims of criminal violence ought to be compensated by the
State, but whether there are any grounds for giving such victims financial support over and above social security benefits
available to others. The committee did point out that the
welfare state did nothing for the victims of crimes of violence
"as such." But why should this matter, provided it does something for them? The working party perhaps thought that social security benefits were too low. If this is so, the right
solution is to increase benefits across the board, not to progroups of needy people at
vide extra benefits for particular
1 28
generality.
the
of
the expense
To highlight the concern, consider the Rhode Island nightclub
fire in February 2003. A rock band, Great White, staged a concert in
an overcrowded nightclub, The Station, in West Warwick, Rhode Is1 29
The pyrotechnics igland, using pyrotechnics as part of their act.
nited foam insulation on the walls of the club, and the ensuing fire
turned the club into a raging inferno that led to one hundred deaths
and almost two hundred injuries,13 ° many of which were very serious
burn cases.13 1 The West Warwick case can serve as a stand-in for the
kinds of catastrophic events-put aside natural disasters-that occur,
seemingly at random, in the course of everyday life. Indeed, a not
entirely dissimilar nightclub disaster had occurred in Chicago, with a

132 The
substantial number of fatalities, less than a month earlier.

West Warwick victims were innocent parties, who, like the victim class

in terrorist-related incidents or instances of violent crime, are highly
13 3
unlikely to realize anywhere near full recovery in the tort system.
128. PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 253 (6th ed. 1999).

129. Thomas Farragher, Behind the Rhode Island Nightclub Fire:Deception, Missteps Sparked a
Tragedy, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2003, at Al.

130. Id.
131. Stephen Smith, 10 Weeks After RI. Fire, 100th Victim Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6,
2003, at B1.
132. Stampede at E2: Fiction and Fact, CHI. T~IB., Mar. 5, 2003, at C26.
133. Early estimates of the total prospective claims in tort for the West Warwick victims
ranged in the area of $1 billion. Christopher Rowland & Jonathan Saltzman, Tragedy in
Rhode Island: Suit Filed in Fire as RIL Mulls Aid Fund; Liability Claims Seen Topping $1B, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al. Tort defendants were not hard to identify. The foam
insulation appeared to be highly flammable, which suggested the possibility of suits against
the owners of the nightclub, as well as the company that supplied the foam, and its manufacturer. Id. The foam had been in place for nearly three years, and yet the municipal fire
inspector had certified the club as recently as two months before the fire-strongly suggesting viable claims against the municipality. Farragher, supra note 129, at Al. The band
itself, of course, and its manager, were certain defendants. And in the search for deep
pockets, Clear Channel, the largest operator of radio stations in the country, which had
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But they are not victims of criminal violence, let alone terrorist activities. Should it matter? Should it matter if they were the innocent
victims of a runaway car plowing through an outdoor street market?'
Bereavement will not serve as an adequate discriminating principle. Presumably, communal sympathy extends to the West Warwick
fire victims in full measure, as to victims of violent crimes. Nor will
bereavement provide an inclusive principle that stops at the victims of
human error, once one considers the innocent and destitute victims
of personal injury from a natural disaster. Ultimately, one is driven to
the question of whether there is any stopping point short of universal
social insurance coverage of (at least) basic out-of-pocket loss that satisfies the dictates of horizontal equity.
Treating like victims in like fashion is, of course, one dimension-but only one-on which the case for nonfault liability might
have been regarded as undertheorized. A comprehensive exploration
of the foundations of nonfault liability required, as Calabresi suggested, sensitivity to considerations of justice (one of which would be
horizontal equity), risk prevention, risk spreading, and administrative
costs. 35 In fact, although these intersecting perspectives were never
explored with the conceptual rigor found in Costs, nonfault legislative
schemes did not rest on barren foundations.
Clearly, if one goes back to the origins of workers' compensation
legislation, the Progressive-era advocates were sensitive to what John
Witt refers to in his survey of the intellectual history of the movement
as "managerial control," by which he means the risk-prevention potenpromoted the concert on its local affiliate and whose disc jockey introduced the band, was
named in early filings. Jonathan Saltzman, Fire Suit Targets Two Large Businesses: Brewer,
BroadcasterNamed in Fatal Blaze, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2003, at B1.
As in the case of September 11, however, it is one thing to identify defendants and
another to recover compensatory damages in tort. In the West Warwick case, too, the
prospect of insolvency cast a pall on tort litigation: the owners, band members, and those
in the supply chain of the foam insulation materials all appeared to be marginally solvent
defendants with limited insurance coverage that might, in fact, be unavailable in any event
if criminal charges were filed. Rowland & Saltzman, supra. The town's liability, even if
established, was limited by state statute to $100,000 per plaintiff. Id. It seemed unlikely
that, even by recourse tojoinder of defendants, anywhere near the out-of-pocket loss would
be recoverable, let alone claims for intangible loss-consider, once again, the serious burn
cases, along with the prospect of 100 wrongful death claims. And in the absence of settlement, a protracted litigation process would almost certainly ensue, during which the plaintiffs would be left to their own resources, with serious liability issues in doubt against some
defendants, particularly the radio station and foam manufacturer. For an account of the
early stages of the litigation process, see Tracy Breton, Judge Refuses to Delay Civil Case
Against Derderians,PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 9, 2004, at Al.
134. SeeJoel Rubin et al., CarPlows Through Crowd in Santa Monica, Killing 9, L.A. TIME9,
July 17, 2003, at 1.
135. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 24-33.
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16
tial of assigning no-fault liability to employers. " Similarly, seminal
figures like John Commons, the influential labor economist at the
University of Wisconsin, were attuned to a risk-distribution rationale
for workers' compensation, grounding it in a broader socioeconomic
1 37
conception of the theoretical premises for social welfare legislation.
And the relevance of administrative cost considerations to the adoption of industrial injury schemes was a principal concern articulated
by the many state industrial injury investigative commissions established after 1900.138
By contrast, in the earliest serious effort to build a bridge from
workers' compensation to a motor vehicle nonfault system, the 1932
13 9
Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents,
the tone is distinctly more grounded in immediate real-world concerns. Although accident prevention is an acknowledged consideration, it is discussed by the Report in the context of complementary
regulatory measures, such as rules of the road and driver's license requirements, rather than as a principal goal of the proposed no-fault
system.' 4 ° More generally, in surveying the concerns with the existing
system of tort liability, the Report focused almost exclusively on the
compensation shortfalls to victims of auto injuries in an era when liacontributory neglibility insurance coverage was spotty at best,14and
1
recovery.
to
bar
absolute
an
gence served as
But a generation later, in 1965, when Keeton and O'Connell unveiled their influential Basic Protection Plan, they addressed in quite
explicit terms, in a chapter primarily addressed to the "fair allocation
of the costs of motoring accidents," issues of resource allocation (as
well as fairness)-citing two then-recently published papers by none
other than Guido Calabresi that would shortly make their way into The
Costs of Accidents.'4 2 Nonetheless, their pragmatic streak was evident in
the Plan itself, which offered a mixed approach: retaining tort liability

136. John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1484-96 (1998).
137. SeeJoHN R. COMMONS &JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 224-

28 (4th rev. ed. 1936).
138. See Lawrence M. Friedman &Jack Landinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 69-70 (1967). See generally Roy LuBovE, THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-1935, at 45-65 (1968).
139. See COLUMBIA PLAN, supra note 109.

140. See id. at 17-19.
141. Id. at 199-217.
142. KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 256-72 (citing Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Guido Calabresi,
The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1965)).
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for "serious" injuries at the same time that it offered basic no-fault
protection for motor injury victims. 43 And this left them vulnerable
to Blum and Kalven's assertion that nonfault liability, at least in the
legislative forum, was characterized by theoretical incoherence.' 44
But Blum and Kalven's criticisms, most fully articulated three
years after the publication of Costs, in Ceilings, Costs and Compulsion in
Auto Compensation Legislation14 5-an apologia, of sorts, for the common-law tort system-seem distinctly myopic. Blum and Kalven challenged the architecture of auto no-fault along the three dimensions
indicated in the title of their critique: ceilings, costs, and compulsion.
In each instance, however, their indictment could as easily be turned
on the tort/fault system itself. Thus, with respect to compulsion, they
raised the question of whether, as a matter of principle, it is just to
compel participation in the auto no-fault scheme-noting only in
passing that the common-law tort system similarly functions as a system of compulsory insurance. Medical malpractice liability, products
liability, and the like impose a "tax" on consumers that would only be
obviated if potential plaintiffs were allowed to waive tort through contractual exculpatory provisions, which had already fallen into disrepute at the time that Blum and Kalven wrote. 4 6
On the cost dimension, the authors noted that "intramural allocation" (risk premium categorization) functioned incoherently in failing to take full account of the risk profile implications of shifting from
third-party to first-party financing.1 4 7 In fact, auto no-fault plans, including New York's, are typically silent on the intramural allocation of
costs, leaving it to the insurers to determine risk categories and attendant premiums."' And more saliently, it is virtually impossible to
experience-rate with any degree of precision in auto cases where, un143. See id. at 273-95.
144. See WALTER J. BLUM &

HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE

PLANS (1965).
145. WalterJ. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341 [hereinafter Ceilings].
146. Id. at 368-70, 376-77; see, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441
(Cal. 1963) (holding as invalid and contrary to public policy a release from future liability
imposed as a condition of admission to a charitable research hospital, and establishing
criteria for the limited circumstances under which an exculpatory clause would withstand
public policy concerns); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
(holding that an automobile manufacturer's disclaimer of an implied warranty of
merchantability was invalid because it was contrary to public policy). It can be added, of
course, that on the compulsion axis, auto no-fault is no different from virtually all of the
major social insurance schemes that compensate for disability and death, such as social
security old-age insurance, SSDI, and workers' compensation.
147. Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, supra note 145, at 363-64.
148. Id. at 364.
LAW PROBLEM: AUTO COMPENSATION
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like the workplace, price discrimination as an accident prevention
measure is probably meaningful only for the more egregious recidivist
types, who are largely immune from influence by civil liability provisions in any event.
Finally, with respect to ceilings, Blum and Kalven viewed the existing landscape of plans and offered two points of principle. On the
one hand, in the case of a high-ceiling plan, as in New York, why have
any ceiling and discriminate among the most seriously injured?1 49 On
the other hand, in the case of the prevailing low-ceiling approach, why
have any plan, when most of the supposedly irrational tort system is
left in place?150 Certainly, workers' compensation, which by contrast
entirely replaces tort, rests on a clearer theoretical premise: that victim compensation ought to be based on a social welfare rationale
rather than a corrective justice foundation. But Blum and Kalven conflate normative and descriptive analysis at this point. There is no reason in principle that an auto no-fault plan need be a two-tier scheme.
Rather, as the authors themselves stress throughout their critique,
auto no-fault on the books, by contrast to an idealized scheme, reflects
political considerations ranging from a desire to keep aggregate system costs within acceptable bounds to a need to keep organizational
excessively threatened by
players within the tort system from feeling
51
the magnitude of proposed reform.1
These latter realpolitik considerations lead into my principal reason for resurrecting Blum and Kalven in this retrospective look at theorizing about nonfault systems of compensation. As I discussed
earlier, auto no-fault became largely a dead letter shortly after Blum
and Kalven's wide-ranging critique appeared. It is revealing, I think,
that very little in the way of sustained theoretical analysis appears in
the succeeding years as a new, if modest, era of focused no-fault initiatives emerges. 152 There are no successors to Blum and Kalven in teasing out the jurisprudential implications of the more recently enacted
plans that I have discussed.
With the exception of the September 11 plan, as I have indicated,
these later efforts almost invariably constitute variations on a more-orless standardized model, harking back to workers' compensation.
Medical expenses are afforded full coverage; out-of-pocket wage loss is
compensable within specified limits reflecting considerations of hori149. Id at 353.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., id. at 34243.
152. Even the academic proposals tend to be functional rather than philosophical in
tone. See supra note 110 (discussing medical malpractice and products no-fault proposals).
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zontal equity, as is future wage loss to a ceiling generally pegged to the
average wage in the state; injury benefits are paid as loss is incurred
rather than as a lump sum; there is recovery of death benefits-and,
under some schemes, pain and suffering, as well-in relatively modest
scheduled amounts.
This somewhat standardized model reflects a patchwork set of influences, more pragmatic. than ideological in character. The value
that society places on rehabilitation and physical restoration is reflected in the impulse to compensate medical expenses in full. Fairness considerations associated with allocating responsibility for harm
directly to risk-imposers are reflected in linking funding responsibility
to the source of the risk. 53 And the desire to keep administrative
costs (as well as aggregate costs) under relatively tight control is embodied in the resort to fixed-amount ceilings on non-economic loss
recovery-when it is allowed at all-rather than allowing discretionary
determinations of intangible loss linked to individual claims of victimization. Surveying the universe of legislative no-fault, these considerations play out in incremental variations in plan design, and do not
reflect a systematic effort to address new issues of principle.
By contrast, on the threshold issue of whether a no-fault system
should be established for a given category of injury victims, matters of
principle loom large-and the search for a satisfying theoretical justification for carving out a particular class of injury victims for special
treatment is constantly renewed. That is why I engaged in a somewhat
extended treatment of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund
at the outset of this Part. And, in fact, I would argue that the inability
to come up with satisfying reasons for affording any given subclass of
injury or disease victims special treatment-even in a mass tort context as overwhelming as asbestos-has played a major role (along with
stalemates in interest group bargaining, of course) in dooming most
such proposals to failure.
B.

The Tort System

From a theoretical vantage point, nonfault liability in the judicial
forum is another matter. Since tort has been traditionally grounded
in a two-party perspective, injured and injurer, normative thinkingthat is, inquiring when losses ought to be shifted-comes with the territory. Oliver Wendell Holmes took this as a challenge to articulate a
153. A subgoal here is to realize at least a measure of deterrence as well as to promote
fairness. But the constraints on recovery of full economic loss, as well as pain and suffering, relegate risk prevention as an objective of these plans to distinctly second-class status.
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theoretical foundation for fault liability in The Common Law. 5 4 Was
the nonfault terrain in 1970 as barren as Calabresi suggests, particularly with respect to the developing concept of strict liability for product-related harms?

55

In a provocative paper published in 1985, George Priest argued
that the rise of strict liability for product injuries could be traced directly to the theoretical work of two influential legal scholars in the
generation preceding Costs, Fleming James and Fritz Kessler, and the
rise of the law and economics movement. 15 6 Indeed, Priest asserted,
this body of theoretical work overshadowed socioeconomic factors
that were often identified as the primary influences on developments
in products liability law. 157 Priest describes in detail the development
of James's view that broad risk distribution should be the governing
principle in personal injury cases, and Kessler's view on the undermining of contract law by the rise of inequality due to the dominant economic power of corporate enterprise. 158 According to Priest, these
twin themes converge in the modem notion of enterprise liability
(read "strict liability") found in Justice 5 9Traynor's landmark concur1
rence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.

A qualifier is necessary here, however. In Costs, Calabresi does
not assert that nonfault liability rests on no theoretical base; rather,
his claim is that the case for nonfault liability was inadequately theorized. 6 ° And certainly, the work ofJames and Kessler, as promoted by
Priest, can be targeted for this indictment. The notable deficiency in
this earlier work is the striking inattentiveness to the risk-prevention
potential of strict liability so thoroughly developed in the work of
Calabresi.1 6 '
154. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-129 (1881).
155. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 3-16.

156. See George L. Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
157. Id. at 464.
158. Id. at 470-96.
159. See id. at 498-99 (discussing Escola, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
160. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 5. In his opening footnote, Calabresi
cites a number of earlier scholars whose work illustrated a "rebirth of interest in accident
law." Id. at 3-5 n.1.
161. For further elaboration, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of
the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 637-38 n.177 (1992). This inattentiveness is especially interesting in view of the prominence of risk prevention in the strict
liability rationale for product injuries in Traynor's Escola concurrence. See Escola, 150 P.2d
at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring) (stating that "public policy demands that responsibility be
fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in
defective products"). There is similar inattentiveness to what Calabresi labels as tertiary
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Interestingly, a full generation before James and Kessler, William
0. Douglas, then a law professor at Yale, authored a highly original
paper on vicarious liability, which offered a policy analysis of respondeat superior from what he referred to as an "administration of risk"
perspective. 1 62 Douglas questioned the conceptual coherence of the
"frolic and detour" test and the independent contractor rule-central
defining characteristics of the limits of respondeat superior liabilityby examining the doctrinal refinements, in good legal realist fashion,
through the lens of three key components of administration of risk:
risk avoidance, risk shifting, and risk distribution.1 6 While the analysis falls short of explicitly recognizing the goal of optimal deterrence,
the theoretical framework is nonetheless a close cousin to the theorizing about accident law that would come to characterize law and
164
economics thinking in the 1970s.

Since the 1970s-that is, in the period after Costs-there is surely
no shortage of theorizing about judicial strict liability, much of which
has addressed the products liability area that was a particular concern
of Calabresi's. It would take me far beyond the confines of this paper
to do justice to a survey of that theoretical literature. 65 Yet in the face
costs; that is, administrative costs associated with competing liability systems. See, e.g., THE
CosTs OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 228.
162. William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584
(1929).
163. Id. at 585-604.
164. Respondeat superior is, of course, still one step removed from nonfault liability,
since it rests on the premise of negligent conduct by the agent. In the half-century preceding Costs, traces of a theoretical sensitivity to risk-prevention considerations in the work of
other legal scholars are identified in John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of
EnterpriseLiability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (2003).
165. A good starting point is Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution:
The Revived Casefor EnterpriseLiability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993). The authors provide
summary views of an array of products liability scholars, through 1993, locating them on a
.products liability matrix." Id. at 695-712. To simplify somewhat, they regard the thencurrent generation's scholars as falling into two camps. In one camp are "the contractarians [who] believe that there are no significant impediments to optimal contracting between consumers and manufacturers in product markets." Id. at 714. In the other camp
are "the regulators, [who] are skeptical of the market's ability to satisfy the deterrence and
insurance goals of products liability law." Id.
Curiously, Calabresi is missing from the roster of "current" scholars surveyed by Croley
& Hanson. Instead, he is relegated to the "first generation" of products liability scholars,
along with FlemingJames, Fritz Kessler (both of whom I have discussed, see supra notes 156159 and accompanying text), and others "whose influence peaked in the decade surrounding the promulgation of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts--that is, from 1960 to
1970." Croley & Hanson, supra, at 691 n.29. The authors themselves clearly fall into "the
regulators" camp, and draw on three themes in providing a revived argument for enterprise liability: "imperfect consumer information ....
exploitative manufacturer market
power .... and risk distribution." Id. at 769. While Calabresi does not offer an expansive
treatment of manufacturer market power, these themes are precisely those that constitute
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of a wide array of normative arguments for nonfault liability, the fault
principle retains its dominant position as the cornerstone of commonlaw tort liability for accidental harm.16 6 How can this be explained?
Whatever the limitations in the "strictness" of strict liability in the
products field, discussed earlier, why has the conceptual apparatus of
nonfault liability seemed uninviting in related areas of accidental
harm? Two representative cases-one an effort to expand strict liability from products to motor vehicle injuries and the other an effort to
rely on the products paradigm to reshape medical malpractice liability-are revealing.
In Hammontree v. Jenner,'6 7 defendant suffered an epileptic seizure
when driving his car, lost control, and the vehicle crashed into a bicycle repair shop, causing the plaintiff, who was working in the shop,
serious injuries.16 8 When defendant established at trial that he had
faithfully taken his anti-seizure medication for many years without any
untoward incident occurring, plaintiff's negligence claim appeared to
be destined for dismissal.' 6 9 In a desperate gamble, her attorney
sought to pursue her case, both in the trial court and on appeal, on a
theory of strict liability, relying on the California Supreme Court's
then-recent receptiveness in products cases to such a change in the
law.

1 70

The appellate court rejected the analogue, relying in the first instance on the fact that motor vehicle accidents, in contrast to product
injuries, are not within the ambit of enterprise liability. 171 But it
would not strain credulity to project the principal goals of enterprise
liability/strict liability-promoting risk-spreading and accident prevention-into the world of auto injuries, particularly if one posits
the framework for his extended theoretical discussion-although concededly not empirically based in any rigorous way-of primary and secondary accident costs. See THE Cos-rS
OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 35-129. If the post-Calabresi theoretical literature has a
dominant theme that is in sharp contrast to his own approach, it is the contractarians, who
argue for a revived role for contractual exculpation based on assumptions about consumer
access to information that diverge from the regulators' perspective.
In a later article, Hanson and a co-author provide an extended treatment of the case
for imperfect consumer information and exploitative market power in the context of arguing for an enterprise liability approach to tobacco-related harms. SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle
D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Casefor Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 1163 (1998).
166. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rlv.
377 (2002).
167. 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1971).
168. Id. at 740.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 741.
171. Id. at 742.
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near-universal auto liability insurance. Rather, the court's underlying
concern is evident in its extensive quotation from an earlier California
Supreme Court case:
To invoke a rule of strict liability on users of the streets and
highways, however, without also establishing in substantial
detail how the new rule should operate would only contribute confusion to the automobile accident problem. Settlement and claims adjustment procedures would become
chaotic until the new rules were worked out on a case-by-case
basis, and the hardships of delayed compensation would be
seriously intensified. Only the Legislature, if it deems it wise
to do so, can avoid such difficulties by enacting a comprehensive plan for the compensation of automobile accident
victims in place of or in addition to the law of negligence.' 7 2
What these fundamentally practical considerations suggest, perhaps, is that the Hammontree court, writing in 1971, surmised that auto
no-fault was waiting in the wings. 17' The last sentence in the quotation suggests as much. But one would be hard-pressed to argue that
Hammontree would be less likely to be decided as it was today, when
auto no-fault is a dead letter; the deference to legislative prerogative
seems to run deeper.
A second case, Hoven v. Kelble, 174 offers an interesting example of
an effort to extend the strict liability concept into the area of responsibility for medical mishaps. Plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest while undergoing a lung biopsy. 175 Apparently shaky about the proposition of
establishing negligence, the plaintiff sued in strict liability as well,
framing his argument, as the court restated it, as "if a plaintiff could
show that a hypothetical virtually perfectly informed doctor, working
in a perfectly equipped hospital, could have avoided the untoward result, the plaintiff could recover, notwithstanding that the defendants
76
exercised reasonable care in all respects."'
The court took the claim seriously, pointing out that many of the
justifications for nonfault liability that had been persuasive in the
products sphere had resonance in the area of medical mishap liability
as well:
172. Id. (quoting Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1968)). The California Supreme Court refused to grant an appeal on December 16, 1971. Id. at 739.
173. On the history of unsuccessful efforts to adopt no-fault in California, see BURKE,
supra note 51, at 103-41.
174. 256 N.W.2d 379 (Wis. 1977).
175. Id. at 380.
176. Id. at 387.
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The provider of medical services appears to stand in substantially the same position with respect to the patient as the
seller of goods does with the consumer. The typical purchaser of medical services cannot evaluate the quality of care
offered because medical services are complex and infrequently bought. The medical care market gives the purchaser little assistance in enabling the purchaser to evaluate
what he or she is buying. It is generally the physician-not
the patient-who determines the kind of services to be rendered and how often. It is the physician not the patient who
prescribes other goods and services, e.g., drugs, therapy, and
hospitalization, that should supplement the physician's services. The physician is in a better position than the patient
to determine and improve the quality of the services, and the
patient's reliance on the doctor's skill, care and reputation is
perhaps greater than the reliance of the consumer of goods.
The difficulties faced by plaintiffs in carrying the burden of
proving negligence on the part of a doctor are well known.
than the
The hospital and doctor are in a better position
17 7
patient to bear and distribute the risk of lOSS.
Nonetheless, in the end, the court dismissed the claim, expressing
concern that the consequences of such a move "cannot be predicted
with sufficient clarity" to warrant regime change. 178 Presumably, this
failure of judicial nerve points in the same direction as in Hammontree:
let the legislature do the job.
Do these expressions of judicial deference reflect legitimate concerns over institutional competence? The short and straightforward
answer to this question is that the courts, in the end, remain wedded
to a vision of tort law that entails great reluctance to assume the mantle of architects of social policy-and imposing a regime of nonfault
liability bespeaks that character. These prudential considerations inexorably counterpose strict liability through judicial edict against its
legislative counterpart. Clearly, the array of legislative no-fault models
discussed in the preceding Part of this Article converge on a set of
characteristics that are simply foreign to the common-law tradition:
scheduled compensation for economic loss, fixed-sum awards (if any)
for non-economic loss, payment as loss arises, and perhaps most critically, hybrid systems featuring threshold nonfault and residual torttype recovery. Not surprisingly in this context, judicially administered
accident law has eschewed venturing very far beyond the familiar domain of fault-based liability, where a patchwork of fairness, corrective
177. Id. at 391 (footnote and citation omitted).
178. Id. at 393.
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justice, and resource allocation principles can be adjusted to the strictures of an individualized interpersonal model of claims resolution.
Coming full circle, this reluctance is evident in the domain of
products liability itself. At a relatively early stage in the reconstruction
of products liability, the New Jersey Supreme Court, at the forefront
of this movement, decided O'Brien v. Muskin Corp."7 9 The case involved a serious injury from a diving incident in a backyard, aboveground swimming pool featuring a vinyl liner at the bottom. 8 0 The
court, in reversing a judgment for the defendant, showed no reluctance to adopt a broad social policy perspective:
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves the
relative need for that product; some products are essentials,
while others are luxuries. A product that fills a critical need
and can be designed in only one way should be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still other products, including
some for which no alternative exists, are so dangerous and of
such little use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost of liability of harm to others.1 8 '
O'Brien evoked a firestorm of criticism aimed at the notion of "generic" risk-utility analysis by courts; that is, judicially imposed nonfault
liability based on sweeping assessments of the social utility of particular products. 18 2 In 1998, when the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability was adopted, generic products liability was relegated to
extremely marginal situations, reflecting virtual unanimity of disapproval of O'Brien.i" 3 Instead, as indicated earlier, in design defect
cases the courts have resorted to incremental cost-benefit analysis embodied in the requirement that plaintiff demonstrate a reasonable alternative design. 18 4 For the most part, true nonfault liability has been
limited to the uncontroversial failure to measure up to consumer expectations in manufacturing defect cases."8 5 The benchmark here, as
in the case of judicial nonfault liability more generally, has been a
179. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983).
180. Id. at 301-02.
181. Id at 306.
182. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1991).
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (excepting the
requirement of proof of a reasonable alternative design only in cases of "manifestly unreasonable" designs, and giving as its sole illustration novelty exploding cigars). The New
Jersey legislature subsequently limited the O'Brien approach to "egregiously unsafe or ultrahazardous" products. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3 (West 2000).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b).
185. Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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constrained view of institutional role rather than the guidance of theoretical perspectives.
IV.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Is the renaissance of nonfault activity that Calabresi noted a generation ago now a historical artifact? That would be too strong a conclusion to draw from my survey of the ensuing years. But surely it has
failed to ripen into a new era of transformed responsibility for accidental harm. I have suggested that political cross-currents have played
the dominant role in stunting the growth of nonfault systems in the
legislative arena. Absent the sense of urgency that is triggered by a
perceived crisis in the delivery of public health services, for example,
or the human devastation of an unprecedented terrorist attack, legislative embrace of a tort replacement system has been hard to come by.
Instead of a bold move to nonfault approaches, the legislative proclivity has been to whittle away at the borders of the traditional fault system through incremental reform, predominantly limitations on
recoverable damages.
Within the domain of tort, the courts have shown a similar reluctance to expand nonfault principles of liability. One might view the
situation as a reciprocal institutional failure of nerve: the judicial tendency has been to rebuff the claims for nonfault liability by reference
to the superior institutional competence of the legislative forum.
Here, it is not so much political cross-currents in play as a pragmatic
sense that nonfault responsibility entails recourse to tradeoffs between
rights and remedies that courts are ill-suited to design and implement.
Tort theory has not played a major role in influencing these developments. But that does not diminish the importance of thinking
analytically about the consequences of remaining substantially wedded to a fault-based liability system that leaves much to be desired
when measured against the three perspectives that Calabresi so clearly
articulated thirty-five years ago: risk prevention, risk spreading, and
administrative cost (as well as the more elusive notion of justice). In
my view, if there is a critical intellectual vacuum that emerges in examining Costs thirty-five years later, it is in the empirical realm. We still
know far too little about the real-world consequences of liability rules
to take full advantage of the intellectual legacy of The Costs of Accidents.

